For the rest of the family, though, there was an added element of disgrace. A crucial challenge is to find ways to spread the benefits of global markets beyond a handful of market-dominant minorities and their foreign investor partners. Stevens was succeeded by other autocrats, who struck essentially the same deal while also successfully courting foreign investment and aid. We devote a whole chapter to the pathologies the Triple Package can carry with it. Chua also attempts to present Arab hatred of Israel largely through this paradigm of ethnic economic advantage. This is not the story everywhere. I was disheartened to know that there are injustices like the one Chua described in her article.
I could commiserate with her because when somebody close to us dies, we all feel upset. Thomas Friedman of The New York Times has been a brilliant proponent of this dominant view. The Triple Package allows people to seize the reins of time—to live not only in the present but also for the future, to devote their full capacities to changing themselves or the world, in small ways or large. She suggests that this scenario does not exist in the developed nations of the world. Still, her larger point, that the policies seen as panaceas by the West can actually make things worse, holds true. The massacres of the lighter-skinned and wealthier Tutsi minority in Rwanda, and the better educated Croats in Serbia are two of the most recent examples.
There is a connection among these episodes apart from their violence. So first we wanted to see if those stereotypes had any truth. There simply is not enough to tax, and nearly no one who can be trusted to transfer revenues. On my 10th birthday she gave me 10 small diamonds, wrapped up in toilet paper. Like many wealthy Filipino Chinese, she had all kinds of bank accounts in Honolulu, San Francisco, and Chicago. Chua is a professor at Yale Law School and her discourse is cautious and evidence-based.
The major exceptions to this are China, Japan, South Korea and Taiwan, all relatively homogeneous, ethnically speaking, and very successful economically. We include many different groups in our book from the Amish to Persian Americans. With the fall of communism and the emergence of al-Qaida, it's no longer fashionable to see ethnic conflict in materialist terms -- the new battles are framed as a clash of civilizations rather than a scramble for resources. Empowering the Hutu majority in Rwanda did not produce desirable consequences. By the 1990s, per capita income in northern Yugoslavia had risen to three times that in the south.
But at the same time, my parents conveyed a sense of insecurity. One beautiful blue morning in September 1994, I received a call from my mother in California. Repeating that promise has helped him win every election since. Amy Chua is professor of law at Yale University. In such conditions, the combined pursuit of free markets and democratisation has repeatedly catalysed ethnic conflict in highly predictable ways. By 1998, Chua writes, Chinese made up 3 percent of the population but controlled 70 percent of the private economy.
Yet her argument, that rapid switches to majoritarian rule and free-market democracy in many Third World countries benefit certain ethnic groups over others and lead to vicious sectarian strife, is quite new, if occasionally overstated. Chua has narrated the various reasons behind certain ethnic minorities dominating specific markets. For the Chinese, luck is a moral attribute, and a lucky person would never be murdered. American culture became more and more oriented toward instant gratification and self-esteem. And the third is violence, sometimes genocidal, directed against the market-dominant minority itself.
On regional and global planes, too, the dynamic of World on Fire augurs ill for stability, not to mention peace. Writers such as Robert Kaplan have long argued that the Western obsession with exporting democracy to countries without the institutions to support it is naive and often dangerous, fostering demagogues and communal hatreds. In the contest between an economically powerful ethnic minority and a numerically powerful impoverished majority, the majority does not always prevail. At the same time, global populist and democratic movements give strength and voice to the impoverished masses. Her second book, Day of Empire: How Hyperpowers Rise to Global Dominance—and Why They Fall, was a critically acclaimed Foreign Affairs bestseller. Throughout the world, global markets are bitterly perceived as reinforcing American wealth and dominance.
More positively, if free market democracy is to prosper, the world's market-dominant minorities must begin making significant and visible contributions to the local economies in which they are thriving. Nor do I argue that ethnic conflict arises only in the presence of a market-dominant minority. In her recent book World on Fire, Yale law professor Amy Chua posits a different, contrarian explanation - one that is both fascinating and highly problematic. Yet her argument, that rapid switches to majoritarian rule and free-market democracy in many Third World countries benefit certain ethnic groups over others and lead to vicious sectarian strife, is quite new, if occasionally overstated. In more non-Western countries than Americans would care to admit, free and fair elections would bring to power anti-market, anti-American leaders.